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Abstract
European countries have increased their use of environmental tax instruments by designing new
tax bases. But, many countries have to face the opposition of the public opinion, for fear of the
distributive consequences of these environmental tax reforms. This paper sheds light on the distrib-
utive consequences of environmental tax policies when households are heterogeneous. The objective
is to assess whether an environmental tax reform could be Pareto improving, when the revenue of
the pollution tax is recycled by a change in the labor tax properties. We show that, whatever the
degree of regressivity of the environmental tax alone, it is possible to design a recycling mechanism
that renders the tax reform Pareto improving, by simultaneously decreasing the average rate of the
wage tax and increasing its progressivity.
JEL classication: D60 - D62 - E62 - H23.
Keywords: Environmental tax reform - Heterogeneity - Welfare analysis - Tax pro-
gressivity.
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1 Introduction
European countries have increased their use of environmental tax instruments by designing
new tax bases, like sulfur dioxide, plastic bags, solid waste and batteries. Even in the
United States are there now warm advocates of the tax against the cap and trade approach,
like James Hansen an American scientist, who claims A rising price on carbon emissions
is the essential underlying support needed to make all other climate policies work. [...]
A rising carbon price is essential to decarbonize the economy, i.e., to move the nation
toward the era beyond fossil fuels. The most e¤ective way to achieve this is a carbon
tax (on oil, gas, and coal) at the well-head or port of entry. [...] The public will support
the tax if it is returned to them [...]. This quite surprising attitude corresponds to a
larger movement in favour of the price instrument. France, following Sweden and other
Scandinavian countries, considered to implement during 2010 a carbon tax at a rate equal
to 17e/ton CO2. Finally, in front of the opposition of the public opinion and the practical
and legal di¢ culties, the government decided to postpone the project until a European
policy would be put in place. The Swedish presidency of the European Union (second
semester of 2009) encouraged the other member countries to implement carbon taxes
bearing on all sectors of activity which are not regulated by the emission quotas system.
But many countries have to face the opposition of the public opinion, for fear of the
distributive consequences of these environmental tax reforms.
What would thus be the inequality consequences of a European Carbon Tax Project or
of the Carbon Contribution planned by the French government as from 2010? As Hansen
suggests it, an environmental tax can hardly be considered without adequate revenue
recycling in order to enhance the acceptance of the environmental policy. But the aim of
such a recycling can therefore be twofold: to reduce, or even annihilate the gross cost of the
policy, as measured by the global welfare loss, or to compensate the generated inequities.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate by designing an environmental
tax reform that could be unanimously accepted.
As well as the cap and trade mechanism, the tax allows to achieve the environmental
objectives while minimizing the global cost. One of the advantages of an environmental
tax is that it provides public revenues which can be recycled. This is a reason why it can be
preferred to subsidies or emission quotas. It has been argued that, as governments use these
revenues to decrease other distortionary taxes, an environmental tax may simultaneously
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improve the environmental quality and achieve a less distortionary tax system, i.e. it may
lead to a double dividend, according to Goulder [18]. This can be a strong argument in
favour of an increasingly green tax system. After Bovenberg and de Mooij [5] who initially
provided a refutation of the double dividend hypothesis, a large body of literature has
deeply analyzed this issue. In particular, Goulder [18] and Ligthart [23] showed that the
existence of the double dividend essentially depends on the possibility of transferring the
global tax burden from the wage earners to some xed production factors or to other
consumers, thus emphasizing the role of heterogeneity. Following in behind this stream of
literature, Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [9] and [10] studied the existence conditions of a
long term double dividend, taking into account the distinction between wage earners and
retired consumers, by means of overlapping generations models.
But one of the disadvantages of the environmental taxes is that, like any consumption
tax, they often appear to be regressive, i.e. more harmful for the welfare of the poorest
households than for the richest ones. In particular, in the French case, a tax on energy
or transport consumption harms the lowest wage households three times more than the
highest wage households (Ruiz and Trannoy [33]). Bureau [7] also shows that the distribu-
tional e¤ects of a carbon tax on car fuels in France are likely to be regressive before revenue
recycling.1 Moreover, the usual recycling of the environmental tax revenues through a de-
crease in the labor tax rate could also be regressive (Metcalf [24]). Somewhat surprisingly,
the analyses of the double dividend issue have until recently neglected the distribution
issue of the welfare gain, although it is usually obtained at the expense of some groups of
agents.
This article analyzes the distributional e¤ects between di¤erent categories of house-
holds and puts forward an appropriate policy mix to ensure a non-decreasing welfare for
each class of workers. We show that whatever the degree of regressivity of the environ-
mental tax alone, it is possible to re-design a recycling mechanism that renders the tax
reform Pareto-improving,2 by modifying the progressivity characteristics of the tax system,
instead of lump-sum transfers or any other way of homogeneous compensation.
We assume that the production technology is a function of capital and heterogeneous
labor. Heterogeneous households live two periods (young and old) and earn wages cor-
1See also Wier et al. [37] for the Danish case.
2 In line with the double dividend literature, we are not seeking for the optimal tax system, which would
require to use several instruments in order to internalize the externalities. Nevertheless, according to our
Pareto-improving criterion, our results give conditions such that the economy gets closer to its Pareto
optimal equilibrium.
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responding to their skill. The labor tax is a very general one that could be either a
progressive or proportional tax. Our demographic assumptions allow us to take into ac-
count several income classes; indeed, we consider (i) the heterogeneity characteristics of
the labor market, (ii) the heterogeneity of the individual income sources. The environmen-
tal policy consists of increasing the tax on polluting capital, in a second-rank framework.
We then characterize the necessary conditions for the obtaining of a double dividend, i.e.
an improvement of the environmental quality and an improvement of the welfare when
the revenue of the pollution tax is recycled by a change in the labor tax rates. Previous
studies show that the obtaining of a double dividend requires economic conditions such
that the double dividend hypothesis seems unrealistic, unless it is obtained through the
worsening of inequalities. Conversely, we show that the conditions for the obtaining of a
double dividend lie in the distributive properties of the labor taxes. The results are de-
pendent on the initial tax system. In a more general framework than Chiroleu-Assouline
and Fodha [11], we show that such a Pareto-improving policy can be obtained even in the
worst cases of regressivity of the environmental tax alone.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 presents
the specication of the balanced tax reform. Section 4 gives the welfare analysis of a tax
policy. In Section 5 we present the environmental e¤ects of the tax reform and Section 6
examines the welfare e¤ects of such a combined reform. The last section concludes.
2 The model
We consider an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous households. We as-
sume that population remains constant, so we normalize it to unity. Agents live two
periods (young and old) and earn wages corresponding to their skill. Each class of house-
hold is characterized by its skill i. There are I classes of agents, and the size of each class
i is qi (with
PI
i=1 qi = 1). qi and I are supposed to be exogenous. Each agent supplies
inelastically one unit of labor3 when young and earns a wage wit, the labor tax rate is
 i 2 [0; 1[. He divides his labor net income between consumption and savings sit. In the
second period the household consumes his savings and the interest he earns. The welfare
3Our long term view allows us to assume full employment. Moreover, we focus on the e¢ ciency double
dividend (according to Goulder [18]) and not on the employment double dividend.
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of an individual born at t is measured with the intertemporal separable utility function:4
U

ciyt ; c
io
t+1

= u(ciyt ) + 
iv(ciot+1) (1)
with cyt denoting the rst-period consumption of the agent born at t, c
o
t+1 his second-period
consumption.
The individual preference rate for the future is denoted by i 2 ]0; 1[.5 We assume that
this rate depends on the class i; i.e. the wage level, of each agent, respecting the following
scheme: i > i 1; 8i 2 I: This assumption encompasses one side of the Keynesian
fundamental psychological law that establishes that the average propensity to save, i.e. the
savings rate, decreases when the income increases. As emphasized by Saez [34], However,
propensities to save vary widely across the population and empirical studies have shown
that savings rates are correlated with education even controlling for income. Therefore,
there is a strong presumption that higher income individuals save more not only because
they have more income to save but also because they might have a better nancial education
and be more aware of the need to save for retirement.For example, Lawrance [22] showed
that subjective rates of time preference, identied from estimation of consumption Euler
equations, are three to ve percentage points higher for households with low permanent
incomes than for those with high permanent incomes.
The two instantaneous components of the utility function exhibit the usual properties:
they are increasing in their argument, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions.
We also impose homotheticity. The real interest rate is rt+1. The households budget
constraints write:   
1   it

wit = c
iy
t + s
i
t
ciot+1 = (1 + rt+1) s
i
t = Rt+1s
i
t
(2)
The households problem is to maximize his lifetime utility (1) with respect to his in-
tertemporal budget constraint given by (2). The First Order Conditions give
v0(ciot+1)
u0(ciyt )
= Rt+1
i (3)
4We do not introduce any direct e¤ect of pollution on the households welfare, but only the indirect one
through the consequences on productivity of the degradation of environmental quality (see below). Indeed
the direct e¤ect would have no impact on the welfare distribution among heterogenous agents while the
indirect one a¤ects the wage gaps, because agents do not di¤er here by their preferences regarding the
environmental quality.
5The assumption of intertemporal separability is not necessary and we could obtain the same results
with a very general utility function such that i =
@U(:)=@ciot+1
@U(:)=@c
iy
t
:
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This yields the optimal consumption and savings path of the representative household,
within the Diamond framework (Diamond [14]) with a homothetic utility function:8>><>>:
ciyt = c
y(Rt+1; w
i
t; 
i
t; 
i)
ciot+1 = c
o(Rt+1; w
i
t; 
i
t; 
i)
sit = s
i(Rt+1; w
i
t; 
i
t; 
i)
(4)
Usual results of comparative static for wit; 
i
t and 
i hold. We also assume that the
degree of intertemporal substitution between consumption when young and consumption
when old () should not be too small, so that the substitution e¤ect will not be dominated
too much by the income e¤ect due to changes in the rate of return Rt+1 (de la Croix and
Michel [13]).
The production sector consists of many rms, each of them being characterized by the
same production function F () with constant returns to scale. They use di¤erent kinds of
labor (high wages - skilled workers, middle wages, low wages - non skilled workers). Our
model shares the mean features of Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [9] and [10]. As in Chao
and Peck [8] or Williams [38] or [39], we assume that the degradation of environmental
quality has a negative impact on the total productivity of factors. This assumption is
justied by the results of an increasing number of empirical studies measuring the health
e¤ects of pollution (OECD [26]) and the impact of the health of workers on labor produc-
tivity (Bloom et al. [3], in a sample consisting of both developing and industrial countries,
found that good health, proxied by life expectancy, has a sizable, positive e¤ect on eco-
nomic growth). Since Ostro [27], many papers have emphasized the loss of productivity
caused by the health e¤ects of pollution, e.g. Samakovlis et al. [35], or Pervin et al. [30]
for air-pollution, and also Bosello et al. [4] or Hübler et al. [20] for the health e¤ects
of climate change. For example, according to Bosello et al. [4] strong heat stress causes
a productivity loss of 3% and extreme heat a loss of 12%. Another source of productiv-
ity loss originates in the impact of pollution on the quality of natural resources (Gollop
and Swinand [17] for the agricultural sector).6 As a result, the total productivity of fac-
6Our model adresses the specic issue of pollutions due to industrial, highly capital-intensive sectors,
that emit ne particles, NOx or SOx. These pollutants are harmful for the health of all agents, and
especially of the workers employed by these sectors. This stylized model can not describe the GHG case,
since the dioxyde emissions have no direct e¤ect on the health and productivity of workers and they are due
to the use of fossil energies which can be susbsituted by carbon free inputs, such as capital or knowledge.
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tors A (Pt) is negatively a¤ected by pollution Pt because pollution degrades the health of
workers or the quality of natural resources (@A (P ) =@P 6 0):
Yt = A (Pt)F (Kt; fLi;tg)
The maximization problem of the representative rm is (taking the output price as
numeraire):
Max
K;fLig
t = A (Pt)F (Kt; fLi;tg) 
IX
i=1
witLi;t   (1 + rt +  et )Kt
with t the current net revenue and wit the real wage rate of class i of workers. The depre-
ciation rate of capital is equal to unity. We assume that pollution is due to capital stock
in order to integrate in a very simple framework the fact that energy use is more likely a
complement to capital than a substitute. The rm pays a tax  e 2 [0; 1[ proportional to
the use of this factor. We hence suppose that there exists a constant technical relationship
between capital stock employed and emission of pollutants.
Since markets are competitive, capital and labor earn their marginal products:(
A(Pt)F
0
K    et = 1 + rt  R(Kt; fLi;tg ; A(Pt);  et )
A(Pt)F
0
Li
= wit W i(Kt; fLi;tg ; A(Pt))
(5)
Let "iL be the elasticity of output to labor, we have "
i
L = F
0
Li
Li;t
F (Kt;fLi;tg) > 0 8i;8t:
We can then write wit =
Yt
Li;t
"iL: Likewise, let "F be the elasticity of output to capital
"F = F
0
K
Kt
F (Kt;fLi;tg) > 0: We obtain R (Kt; fLi;tg ; A(Pt);  et ) =
Yt
Kt
"F    et :
This yields, at the equilibrium of the labor markets (i.e. Li;t = qi;8i 2 I;8t):
Yt = A (Pt)F (Kt)
The ratio of wages is (using 5), 8i 2 I:
wit
w1t
=
F 0
Li
F 0
L1
=
"iL
"1L
q1
qi
The di¤erent labor classes are conventionally ranked by growing skills, i.e. by growing
wages:
wit > w
i 1
t ,
"iL
qi
>
"i 1L
qi 1
7
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We assume that government spending (G) is entirely nanced by current taxes. The
governments budget constraint states that its purchases must be equal to, at each period,
its tax revenues generated by the pollution tax and the labor tax:
IX
i=1
qi
i
tw
i
t + 
e
tKt = Gt (6)
We dene a progressivity index of the labor tax, such as:
 i = 1 + ab (i)
where 1 is the at component of the tax rate and a is a positive parameter called from
now on the progressivity multiplier of the labor tax. Assume b(i + 1) > b(i) 8i > 1:
We consider the general case for the characteristics of the tax progressivity. For example,
the design of progressivity ts well the characteristics of the French tax system when
b(i+ 2)  b(i+ 1) < b(i+ 1)  b(i):
This yields, regarding the labor tax revenue:
IX
i=1
qi
iwi =
IX
i=1
 i"iLY = Y
 
1
IX
i=1
"iL + a
IX
i=1
b(i)"iL
!
(7)
Let us dene "L =
IP
i=1
"iL > 0 and B as the sum
IP
i=1
b (i) "iL. B > 0; which is constant
for any given I and progressivity characteristics fb(i)g1iI .
Like in our companion paper7 (Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [11]), we assume capital-
intensive sectors to be polluting sectors. To keep things simple, as we deal only with a
one sector aggregate output, we assume that capital input is the main source of pollution
(even if it is only a proxy) either because capital and energy are more complement than
substitutes or, in a broader view, because capital accumulation favors the production of
pollution-intensive goods. For industrial pollution, this is consistent with evidence (Brown
et al. [6], Gale and Mendez [16], Antweiller et al. [1]). Antweiller et al.[1] nd that a 1%
increase in a nations capital-to-labor ratio, holding scale, income, and other determinants
constant, leads to perhaps a one percentage point increase in pollution.
7 In Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [?], we assume weak heterogeneity among households, who only
di¤er via their labor skill. Moreover, the environmental tax bears on savings. The model is fully solved
analytically as we have specied, in the simpliest way, preferences and technologies. In contrast, in the
present article, householdsheterogeneity concerns their preferences too. The environmental tax bears on
the polluting capital, which is closer to a polluter-payer principle. And nally, since we do not specify any
functions, the results are more general.
8
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The dynamics of pollution is described by the following law of motion:
Pt = (1  h)Pt 1 + Kt 1  P (Pt 1;Kt 1) (8)
where h is the constant rate of natural absorption of pollution (0 < h < 1) and  > 0
stands for the emission rate of pollutants.
The equilibrium condition of the capital market, meaning that the capital stock in
period t+1 is the amount saved by young individuals in period t, is obtained by substituting
the zero-prot condition, the governments budget constraint (eq. 6) and the households
budget constraints (eq. 2) into the equilibrium of the output good market. It writes:
Kt =
IX
i=1
qis
i
t 1
By substituting eq. 4 and using eq. 5, we nally obtain:
Kt =
IX
i=1
qis
i
 
W i [Kt 1; fqig ; A(P (Pt 2;Kt 2))] ; R [Kt; A(P (Pt 1;Kt 1));  et ] ;  it 1; i

(9)
The competitive equilibrium is thus described by the set
n
c^iyt ; c^
io
t ; s^
i
t
oi=I
i=1
; K^t; Y^t; P^ ; G^t; w^t; r^t
t=+1
t=0
satisfying equations f(4) ; (5) ; (6) ; (8) ; (9)gt=+1t=0 : A steady state equilibrium is an alloca-
tion where capital and pollution are stationary, i.e. K^ and P^ are such that (using (8) and
by substitution of (4) and (5) in (9)):
K^ =
IX
i=1
qis^
i (10)
P^ =

h
K^ (11)
For some given initial conditions fK0;K 1; P 1g and for a given triplet of tax policy
instruments,

 e; 1; a
	
, we assume that there exists a long-term locally stable steady-state
dened by

K^; P^

such that:
K^ = K
 
 e; 1; a; fb (i)g ;i	 (12)
P^ = P
 
 e; 1; a; fb (i)g ;i	
Using eq. (5) and (10), one obtains the output value at the steady-state equilibrium:
Y^ = Y
 
 e; 1; a; fb (i)g ;i	 (13)
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.48
3 The specication of the balanced tax reform
We assume an exogenous increase of the environmental tax rate, imposed by the govern-
ment in order to control pollution. The amount of government spending is assumed ex post
invariant, and the tax policy has to maintain the amount of the tax revenues constant.
This increase d e of the environmental tax rate can be accompanied by a variation of the
labor tax rates d i by two potential means: a homogenous variation of all labor tax rates
through the at rate component (d1) or a variation in the progressivity of the labor tax
(through a variation of the progressivity multiplier da). At the steady-state equilibrium,
the governments budget constraint is (using (6) and (7)):
 
1"L + aB

Y^ +  eK^ = G^ (14)
Let us rst dene the following elasticities (in absolute values) computed at the steady-
state equilibrium: "A =
K^A^0K=A^ > 0 the elasticity of the total factor productivity w.r.t.
the stock of capital (through pollution); "1 =
1K^ 01=K^ > 0; "e =  eK^ 0e=K^ > 0
and "a =
aK^ 0a=K^ > 0 measure respectively the elasticity of the steady-state equilibrium
stock of capital w.r.t. A; 1;  e and a.
The link between the variations of the pollution tax and of the characteristics of the
labor tax is obtained through the di¤erentiation of constraint (14), which is quite direct
(using eq. 10 and 13).
Any balanced tax reform is then characterized by the following relationship between
d e, d1 and da (with dG = dqi = di = 0): 
"L
bYbK   "11 C
!
d1 +
 
B
bYbK   "aa C
!
da+

1  "e
 e
C

d e = 0 (15)
where C =

1  "A"F

(R+  e)
 
1"L + aB

+  e, constant.
Assumption 1: We assume that 1 > "F   "A > 0:
"F  "A is the total measure of the sensitivity of output to capital stock through the direct
e¤ect "F of capital stock as an input, and the indirect e¤ect "A; which corresponds to
the impact of capital stock on total productivity of factor, via the evolution of pollution.
The direct contribution of capital to output is therefore assumed to be greater than the
10
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indirect one. The reverse ("F < "A) would be of negligible economic interest because any
rise in  e would result in a decrease of K allowing an increase of Y . Under Assumption
1, we can easily show that C >  e > 0:
We will study two polar cases for balancing this environmental tax reform:
 uniform variation of all labor tax rates, with invariant progressivity (da = 0):
d1 =  
1  "e
 e
C
"L
bYbK   "11 C
d e =    d e (16)
 variation of the progressivity, with invariant at rate component of the tax rate
(d1 = 0):
da =  
1  "e
 e
C
B
bYbK   "aa C
d e =   
 d e (17)
Proposition 1 The sign of the balanced tax reform multipliers  and 
 is a priori unde-
termined and depends on the initial tax rates and on the values of the various elasticities.
Proof. (i) The numerator measures the e¤ect of the change in pollution tax rate on its
revenue. There are both a value e¤ect (the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, for
unchanged stock of capital) and a tax base e¤ect (the stock of capital decreases, and so
does the output; as the tax rate increases, so the tax base erodes), which work in opposite
ways. As a result, this term might be positive or negative.
(ii) The denominator measures the e¤ect of the change in labor tax rate on its rev-
enue. There are also both a value e¤ect (the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, for
unchanged wages) and a tax base e¤ect (the wages decrease as the tax rate increases, thus
the tax base erodes) which work in opposite ways. As a result, this term too might be
positive or negative.
As the signs of the numerator and of the denominator are undetermined, the sign of the
necessary change in the labor tax components is also undetermined.
Assumption 2: We only consider the La¤er-e¢ ciency case, where the sign of the bal-
anced tax reform multipliers  and 
 is positive.
Using eq. 15, Assumption 2 implies sign
h
1  "e
 e
C
i
= sign
h
"L
bYbK   "11 C
i
= sign
h
B
bYbK   "aa C
i
.
The case of tax ine¢ ciencies is of minor interest in our model since it corresponds to weak
11
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pollution externality, inducing very low environmental tax revenue, or to a very strong
sensitivity of capital stock to the environmental tax variation. Under Assumption 2, we
do not consider those very specic and extreme cases. Nevertheless, considering the latter
cases would not change our results, it would only put in light some particular results.
4 Welfare analysis
Like Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [10] and [11], we examine here the welfare e¤ects of
the tax change for a generation during its life-cycle, once the nal steady-state equilibrium
is reached. In this section, the welfare issue is thus a long term one.
One can measure the welfare e¤ects of small tax changes by the marginal excess burden.
It corresponds to the additional income that needs to be provided to the representative
household to keep her utility at its initial level: this is the compensatory income variation,
denoted dRc. It stands for the excess welfare loss of the consumers over and above the
tax revenues collected by the government and can be interpreted as the hidden costs of
nancing public spending: a positive value for the marginal excess burden indicates a loss
in welfare after the tax reform.
Let us determine the compensatory income variation which, after the tax reform, would
leave the level of life-cycle utility unchanged (dU = 0):
@U
@ciy
dciy +
@U
@cio
dcio = 0
We use the rst-order condition of the representative households program, which gives,
using 2 and 3:
() R dciy + dcio = 0
The intertemporal budget constraint of household i writes:
 
1   iwi = ciy + 1
R
cio
Applying the denition of the compensatory income variation dRic: 
1   i dwi   wi  d1 + b(i)da+ dRic =   1R2 cio dR
this leads to:
dRic =  
 
1   i dwi + wi  d1 + b(i)da  1
R2
cio dR (18)
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Unlike Bovenberg and de Moiij [5] and the greatest part of the literature on this subject,
it is here impossible to distinguish an environmental component and a non-environmental
one, because pollution and production a¤ect each other. In this paper, we are thus con-
strained to depart from the usual denition of the double dividend (Goulder [18]) because
of this non-separability: a double dividend will be characterized by the simultaneous de-
crease of pollution (which stands for the usual rst dividend) and increase of economic
welfare (which depends here also on the pollution level).
The increase of welfare is veried for any variations of consumptions such that @U=@ciy dciy
+ @U=@cio dcio > 0. This property plays an important role in our results. The rst divi-
dend requires a decrease of the capital stock inducing a decrease of the output, but this
does not prevent the obtaining of the economic dividend. This originates from the opposite
impacts of K on W and R: dW=dK > 0 and dR=dK < 0. Such a decrease in the capital
stock has a negative impact on both consumptions through the wage rate e¤ect but it can
be compensated by the positive inuence on consumption when old through the interest
rate e¤ect.
We now compute these two impacts of the capital stock on the input prices. Concerning
the wage rate, we have (from 5):
dw^i =   ("F   "A) w^i
h"1
1
d1 +
"e
 e
d e +
"a
a
da
i
< 0
The impact of any tax increase on wage is unambiguously negative. This e¤ect harms
all households welfare through two channels. It rst decreases the wage rate, which is a
base e¤ect that increases the compensatory income variation. Secondly, this policy also
reduces the net income as the tax rate increases, the latter plays as a rate e¤ect that also
increases the compensatory income variation.
We now turn to the impact of the policy on the interest rate.
dR^ =
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)]

"1
d1
1
+ "e
d e
 e
+ "a
da
a

  d e R 0
The nal e¤ect on the interest rate is a priori undetermined. Indeed, any tax rate increase
lowers the equilibrium level of the capital stock. This drop induces a higher marginal
productivity of capital that increases the interest rate. But, the drop in capital stock
reduces pollution stock as well, and therefore rises global productivity of factors which in
turn pulls the interest rate down.
13
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We nally obtain:
dRic = Z
i

"1
d1
1
+ "e
d e
 e
+ "a
da
a

+ w^i
 
d1 + b(i)da+ s^i
R^
d e
with Zi =
 
1   i w^i ("F   "A) R^+  e (1  ["F   "A]) s^iR^ : Although the compensatory
income variation dRic measures the monetary e¤ect of the gross welfare variation, we also
need to compute this variation relatively to the initial wage rate in order to assess the
regressivity properties of the tax reform.
Denition 1 A tax is welfare regressive if and only if an increase of its rate implies a
relative compensatory income variation dRic=w^
i decreasing with i.
Obviously, the ratio s^i=w^i is positively and directly determined8 by the value of i
which is increasing with i.
Proposition 2 Any non-compensated increase of the environmental tax is harmful for
household i:
(i) 8 s^
i
w^i
when 1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)]  0;
(ii) for
s^i
w^i

 R^(1  i)("F "A)1 [R^+e][1 ("F "A)]
 when 1  hR^+  ei [1  ("F   "A)] < 0.
Corollary 3 When 1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)] < 0, household i such that s^
i
w^i
>
 R^(1  i)("F "A)1 [R^+e][1 ("F "A)]

benets from the environmental tax.
Proof. Let us compute this e¤ect for agent i:
dRic
w^id e
=
Zi
w^i
+
1
w^i
s^i
R^
=
 
1   i ("F   "A) + 1
R^
s^i
w^i

1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)]

Regarding the harmfulness properties of the environmental tax, we need to have dRic  0.
8For several specications of the preferences of the households, s^
i
(1 i)w^i is equal to 
i: More generally,
s^i
w^i
is positively correlated to i: Notice that 1
(1 i) is also increasing with i: As we have w^
i+1 > w^i and
i+1 > i, we then have s^i+1
(1 i+1)w^i+1 >
s^i
(1 i)w^i and
s^i+1
w^i+1
> s^i
w^i
:
14
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The conditions dened in Proposition 2 ensure harmfulness despite a specic e¤ect due
to life-cycle assumption. As the propensity to save of the richest households is higher, their
consumption when old is also relatively higher. Indeed the increase of the environmental
tax lowers the capital stock increasing hence the rate of return of savings. The benet of
this e¤ect is greater when the share of savings is high. Therefore, the environmental tax
is harmful if the savings rate is lower than the threshold dened by
 R^(1  i)("F "A)1 [R^+e][1 ("F "A)]
.
Corollary 4 If the environmental tax is harmful, it is also welfare regressive when
(i) 1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)]  0 if and only if

0@ s^i
w^i
1A
 i
 R^("F "A)
1 [R^+e][1 ("F "A)] ;
(ii) 1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)] < 0.
Proof. The environmental tax is welfare regressive if and only if the poorest households
bear the heaviest burden of the increase of the environmental tax, i.e. 
 
dRic

= dRi+1c  
dRic  0 i.e.   i ("F   "A) + 

s^i
w^i
 1  hR^+  ei [1  ("F   "A)]
R^
 0
As i and  i increase with i, according to Assumption 1, the sign of 
 
dRic

depends on
the sign of 1 
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)].
Combining the su¢ cient conditions for harmfulness and welfare regressivity, we obtain
that there exists a threshold for the savings rate and the initial environmental tax rate
given by
("F   "A) R^ > "F   "A
1  ("F   "A)
R^
R^+  e
> 1
(1   i)
s^i
w^i
Under this su¢ cient condition, any increase of the environmental tax rate is harmful and
regressive.
Proposition 5 (i) The increase of the wage at tax is harmful if and only if
s^i
w^i

R^[1+(1  i)("F "A)]
[R^+e][1 ("F "A)] . (ii) It is welfare regressive i.e. it more heavily penalizes the lowest
wage-earners.
Proof. Let us compute this e¤ect for agent i:
dRic
w^id1
=
Zi
w^i
+ 1 =
 
1   i ("F   "A)  R^+  e (1  ["F   "A]) s^i
w^iR^
+ 1
15
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The condition dRic  0 gives the threshold for harmfulness and, as  i and s^
i
w^i
are both
increasing with i, this tax is always welfare regressive.
Proposition 6 The e¤ect of an increase of the progressivity multiplier of the wage tax on
welfare of agents i is harmful if and only if
s^i
w^i
 R^[b(i)=
"a
a
+(1  i)("F "A)]
[R^+e][1 ("F "A)] .
Proof. Let us compute this e¤ect for agent i:
dRic
w^ida
=
Zi
w^i
"a
a
+ b(i) =
 
1   i ("F   "A)  R^+  e (1  ["F   "A]) s^i
w^iR^

"a
a
+ b(i)
The condition dRic  0 gives the threshold for harmfulness.
Obviously, the total e¤ect of such an increase in the progressivity multiplier a can be
either progressive or regressive, depending on the relative strengths of the regressivity of
Zi=w^i and the progressivity characteristics of b(i).
5 The environmental e¤ects of the tax reform
As steady-state pollution depends only on steady-state capital, we nd straightforward
that the rst dividend (i:e: a decrease of pollution) is reached if dP^ =

h
dK^ < 0: This
condition rewrites (see equation 12):
dK^ =  
"
"1
K^
1
d1 + "e
K^
 e
d e + "a
K^
a
da
#
< 0
, "1
1
 +
"a
a

 <
"e
 e
,

1  "e
 e
C
24 "11
"L
bYbK   "11 C
+
"a
a
B
bYbK   "aa C
35 < "e
 e
The La¤er-e¢ ciency assumption does not guarantee that the environmental dividend
occurs. It would need a low positive impact on capital, because of the decrease of the wage
tax, compared to the negative impact of the environmental tax.
Proposition 7 The environmental tax reform ensures the environmental dividend if and
only if
(i)  <
"e
 e
=
"1
1
when the revenues are recycled only through a decrease of the wage at
tax;
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(ii) 
 <
"e
 e
=
"a
a
when the revenues are recycled only through a decrease of the progressivity
multiplier of the wage tax
(iii)
"1
1
+
"a
a

 <
"e
 e
when the revenues are recycled through a decrease of both the wage
at tax and the progressivity multiplier of the wage tax.
With respect to the environmental objective of the policy, the tax reform should not
involve a too strong decrease of the labor tax rate in order to limit the economic boost.
6 The welfare e¤ects of the tax reform under regressivity
conditions
Since we intend to focus on the worst case, we assume that the environmental dividend
id obtained (i.e. conditions (i) to (iii) of Proposition (7) are veried) and that the envi-
ronmental tax is both harmful for all households and regressive.9 As each policy does not
a¤ect all classes equally, one can wonder which one would be preferred by each class of
worker.
Proposition 8 When the impact on the steady-state capital stock of a balancing variation
of 1 is greater than the impact of a balancing variation of a, (i) the revenue recycling
of the environmental tax reform preferred by the workers of the lowest classes consists of
a decrease in the at rate component of the tax rate 1 (ii) but the one preferred by the
workers of the highest classes consists of a decrease in the progressivity of the wage tax
rate.
Proof. Let us compare the compensatory income variations associated with each policy.
 First case (dRi(1)): uniform variation of all labor tax rates (with invariant progres-
sivity): da = 0 and d1 =    d e
dRic(
1)
d e
=  Zi
h"1
1
  "e
 e
i
  w^i + s^
i
R^
() dR
i
c(
1)
w^id e
=   Z
i
w^i|{z}
+
h"1
1
  "e
 e
i
| {z }
 
  |{z}
+
+
1
R^
s^i
w^i
9This is the case when 8i 2 [1; I] ("F   "A) R^ > "F "A1 ("F "A)
R^
R^+e
> 1
(1 i)
s^i
w^i
  i , i.e. when the
preference rate for the future (or the propensity to save) is not too high. Hence, a su¢ cient condition is
"F "A
1 ("F "A)
R^
R^+e
> 1
(1 i)
s^I
w^I
:
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The sign of this compensatory income variation is not the same whatever the class of
households. By substituting the value of Zi into the latter condition, we show that
this recycling option induces a relatively higher welfare loss for the richest households
than for the poorest ones:
dRic(
1)
w^id e
> 0() s^
i
w^i

R^
h
 +
 
1   i ("F   "A) "11   "e e i
1 +
h
R^+  e
i
[1  ("F   "A)]

"1
1
  "e
 e

 Second case (dRi(a)): variation of the progressivity (with invariant at rate compo-
nent): d1 = 0 , dai = b (i) da and da =   
 d e
dRic(a)
d e
=   Zi|{z}
+
h"a
a

  "e
 e
i
| {z }
 
  w^ib(i)
| {z }
+
+
s^i
R^
() dR
i
c(a)
w^id e
=   Z
i
w^i|{z}
+
h"a
a

  "e
 e
i
| {z }
 
  b(i)
| {z }
+
+
1
R^
s^i
w^i
A similar reasoning applies here: since Zi=w^i decreases with i, conversely s^
i
w^i
and
b(i) increase when i increases unlike 
 that is constant, this recycling option induces
a relatively higher welfare loss (that may turn into a welfare gain) for the poorest
households than for the richest ones.
The signs of these compensatory income variations depend on the values of the char-
acteristics of the economy (b(i); "F ; "A; "a; "e) and of the initial tax rates ( e,  i, a). The
result above suggests that, in the case where some workers classes would be su¤ering
from a deterioration of their welfare after the above tax reforms, an appropriate policy
mix could be designed in order to leave each workersclass unharmed by the environmen-
tal tax reform : it would consist in an increase of the progressivity index together with a
decrease of the at rate component of the wage tax rate.
Assume that the balanced tax reform is dened by d1 < 0 and da =  d1 with
 > 0 hence da > 0. Such a compensation for the increase in the environmental tax rate
will imply a greater decrease of 1 than above because the degree of progressivity is raised.
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Proposition 9 For economies where a decrease in the minimal wage rate does not su¢ ce
to re-establish the welfare of some class of worker, one can choose  in order to ensure
that all classes will be better o¤ with the environmental tax reform.
Proof. Let us specify the link implied by such a policy between the increase in the
environmental tax rate and the decrease in the at component of the wage tax.
d e =   1

d1   1


da =   1






  

d1
The compensatory income variation of the balanced mix policy is:
dRi() =  
h
Zi
"1
1
+ w^i

 

Zi
"a
a
+ w^ib(i)


i  


   
 + Zi "e
 e
+
s^i
R^

- dRi() S 0; 8i = 1; :::I:
- dRi() is not monotonous in b (i), nor in , 8i.
- If dRi(1) < 0; 8i = 1; :::I, all classes will be better o¤ even with  = 0:
If 9i; dRi(1) > 0; as the function dRi() is bound for each , there is one { which
maximizes it:
{ = INT
h
argmax dRi()
i
One can choose  > 0 in order to nullify dR{() : it ensures that all classes will be better
o¤ (their compensatory income variations are all negative or null).
 =
Z{
"1
1
+ w^{   1


Z{
"e
 e
+ s^
i
R^

Z{
"a
a
+ w^{b({)  1

Z{
"e
 e
+ s^
i
R^

This policy mix aims to reduce the pre-existing distortions of the tax system, in a
second-best world, but not to reach an optimal outcome. Therefore  comes from our
Pareto-improving criterion but not from any optimality criterion. Figure 1 shows the
qualitative impact of such a policy mix on the design of the wage tax.
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Fig. 1: Prole of the wage tax rates after the tax reform
The government can thus combine variations of the two parts of the wage tax rate
and design a policy-mix system: by increasing the tax burden for the upper brackets, it is
possible to earn greater tax revenues than through the environmental tax alone, and then
to decrease more the income tax of the rst rate bracket. Therefore, all classes are less
taxed but even the poorest class would benet from the environmental tax reform. The
increase in the welfare of the upper classes will be reduced, but is still high, comparatively
to the lower classes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown in a very general framework, that a budget-neutral environ-
mental tax reform may result in a double dividend, even when the economy is characterized
by heterogenous agents (old and young) and many worker classes (heterogenous labor).
We have analyzed the distributional e¤ects of several tax policies between di¤erent
categories of households and put forward an appropriate policy mix to compensate them,
in order to ensure a non-decreasing welfare for each class of workers.
We have also emphasized that the conditions for the obtaining of a double dividend
depend on the distributive properties of the labor taxes. Hence, we have shown that (i)
an increase of the environmental tax deteriorates the welfare of all and is regressive, (ii)
the low paid workers prefer an environmental tax reform balanced by a decrease in the
at rate component but the high paid workers prefer a decrease of the progressivity.
We have demonstrated that whatever the degree of regressivity of the environmental
tax alone, it is possible to re-design a recycling mechanism to obtain a Pareto-improving
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tax reform, by modifying the progressivity characteristics of the tax system, instead of
lump-sum transfers or any other way of homogeneous compensation. The mechanisms
underlying this result can be summarized as follows. The primary consequence of the
environmental policy is the decrease of the pollution allowed by the decrease of the capital
stock which also implies a reduction of the output. The cost of this environmental benet
consists in a fall in the gross wages of all agents. Nevertheless, for some groups of agents,
this decline of the gross wages may be slowed by a decrease of their labor tax rate. The
harmful e¤ect of the fall in net wages on the total life-cycle consumption can be somehow
counterbalanced by the drop in the capital stock, implying a rise of the interest rate which
benets the second-period consumption.
The heterogeneity characteristics of the economy and the progressivity of the labor tax
allow the government to obtain more revenues from the environmental policy. The decrease
of the at rate component can be greater without compromising the environmental benet.
Moreover, it enables the redistribution of welfare between the agents in order to fulll our
Pareto-improvement criterion.
Observe that even if the productivity is insensitive to pollution (A0P = 0) and/or if the
pollution would a¤ect the households welfare in an additive way, our results would still
be robust and contribute to the standard literature.
One of the reasons for the failure of the French carbon tax (so-called Carbon Contri-
bution) in 2010 was that the intended revenue-recycling process was hardly understood
by the tax-payers and that it did not manage to make the reform acceptable. But in
fact, a careful design of a broader tax reform should have reached this goal by alleviating
the e¤ect of the carbon tax on the poorest agents and increasing the fairness of such a
policy. This kind of revenue recycling should be considered by policy-makers as it allows
to eliminate all obstacles to the acceptation of the environmental tax reform.
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